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Abstract
Communication has been shown to increase proposer power in multilateral bargaining
settings that use majority voting rule via competition between non-proposers for a place in
the coalition. In this paper we investigate whether communication affects bargaining out-
comes and the bargaining process settings in which the competition effect is not present.
We study committees that use unanimity rule to pass allocations. We find that in these
settings, communication has the complete opposite effect compared with the majority set-
tings: under unanimity, communication eliminates the inefficiencies that are present in
settings without communication and it shifts bargaining outcomes towards egalitarian al-
locations with no proposer power. We investigate the mechanism behind this result using
the content of communication during the bargaining process.
1 Introduction
Communication is an integral part of bargaining processes. Formal bargaining is typically pre-
ceded by informal conversations between involved parties who attempt to influence bargaining
results. For instance, in legislative policy-making, legislators spend a considerable amount of
time and resources communicating with each other before bringing bills to the floor for a vote.
Similarly, in arbitration cases and trade agreements, negotiations between conflicting parties
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are a vital part of the bargaining process. In many of these examples, bargainers communicate
with each other despite the fact that they have commonly known unaligned preferences regard-
ing bargaining outcomes and there is no incomplete information embedded in the environment.
Great strides have been made in the bargaining literature to better understand the effects of
communication on bargaining outcomes and on the bargaining processes underlying these out-
comes. Much of the work that analyzes the effects of communication in complete-information
multilateral bargaining setups comes from experimental studies. Agranov and Tergiman (2014)
were the first to introduce communication in multilateral bargaining and showed that this alone
allows proposers to increase their shares to nearly theoretical levels. Work by Baransky and
Kagel (2015) further confirmed these findings. Both of these studies focused on bargaining
games that use a majority voting rule to pass proposed allocations.1 A majority voting rule
means that a proposer allocates positive shares only to a subset of committee members (the
minimum winning coalition, i.e. those who are expected to support the proposed allocation)
and appropriates the remaining funds. The introduction of communication under a majority
voting rule allows the proposer to create an auction for a place in the coalition among non-
proposers, which ultimately drives the shares of coalition partners down via a “competition
effect.” By exploiting this competition effect, the proposers are able to appropriate a higher
share of resources in committees that allow negotiations between its members compared to
those that restrict such negotiations.
In this paper we investigate whether communication in bargaining has a role that goes
beyond allowing competition to flourish. We do this by studying multilateral bargaining with
a different voting rule often used in real-life bargaining situations: the unanimity rule, which
requires support of all committee members. By changing the voting rule from majority to
unanimity, we completely remove the competition effect discussed above. Specifically, we run
a series of laboratory experiments in which a five-member committee is charged with allocating
a unit of resources between its members using a standard bargaining protocol a` la Baron and
Ferejohn (1989). At the beginning of the bargaining stage, one member of the committee
is chosen at random to propose a budget allocation. All committee members observe this
allocation and vote either to support or reject the proposed budget. If all members support the
allocation, then the budget passes, the game ends and the committee dissolves. If the budget
is rejected, then the committee goes into the next bargaining stage with the same bargaining
protocol. Our treatments vary whether committee members can communicate with each other
before the proposed allocation is submitted.2
Given that the “competition effect” is absent under a unanimity rule, one might expect that
communication under such a voting rule might have no impact on proposer power. However,
1Recently, communication has been also incorporated in the dynamic bargaining games that do not end once
the resources are allocated (see Baron, Bowen and Nunnari (2017) and Agranov, Cotton and Tergiman (2017)).
2Our communication tool allows committee members to send any kind of text message to any subset of mem-
bers in their group, including private messages to individual members and public messages that are delivered to
all members of the group.
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our results show that this is far from the case. In fact, adding communication under a unanim-
ity rule has two strong effects. First, contrary to the competition effect observed in majority
settings, proposers lose power and appropriate a smaller share of resources when members can
communicate with each other. Specifically, without communication, in the vast majority of
passed proposals (more than 85%), the proposer appropriates a higher share than any other
committee member, while more than 90% of all passed allocations in the treatment with com-
munication are exact five-way equal splits. Second, communication improves efficiency both
in terms of the likelihood of delays occurring and, consequently, the overall resources appropri-
ated by bargainers. Committees that allow communication rarely experience delays in reaching
decisions (less than 7% of the cases) and appropriate 99% of available resources. Without com-
munication, delays are very common and occur in 44% of the cases and committees lose about
15% of available resources. This last result speaks to the debate regarding the disadvantages
of the unanimity rule. (See the discussion in Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and Miller and
Vanberg (2013)).
To investigate the mechanism through which communication interacts with the voting rule
and affects final outcomes, we analyze communication logs. We have three main results in
this respect. First, when unanimous support is required to pass proposals, subjects choose to
communicate publicly by sending messages that are delivered to the entire committee. This is
strikingly different from the overwhelmingly private chatting behavior observed under a major-
ity rule setting, as documented by Agranov and Tergiman (2014). Second, public and private
statements serve opposite purposes. When subjects choose to communicate privately via back-
room channels, they lobby for themselves, in particular their place in the coalition and their
share. When subjects choose to make public statements, these statements serve to promote
equality and a more egalitarian distribution of resources between all members. The prevalence
of public messages coupled with the content of these messages is the driving force behind the
egalitarian allocations observed in committees that use a unanimity rule and permit communi-
cation between its members. Third, the actions of proposers are responsive to the content of
deliberation despite the fact that these deliberations are cheap-talk. The proposed allocations
are more likely to feature an equal split of resources between all committee members and a
smaller proposer share when members discuss fairness. The opposite is true when members
discuss self-interest.
Overall, the results documented in the current study and in Agranov and Tergiman (2014)
show that the impact of communication on bargaining greatly depends on the voting rule in
place. Under a majority rule, communication leads to higher proposer power via the competi-
tion effect. However, when the competition effect is removed, as is the case under unanimity
rule, communication is detrimental to the proposer and completely removes proposer power.3
3Our results are in line with those documented in bilateral bargaining settings: Roth (1995) shows that in a
two-player game, allowing face-to-face communication, leads to more equal shares of the bargainers. Unfortu-
nately, there is no record of face-to-face communication between bargainers, which precludes a more thorough
investigation of the content of communication and comparison with our current setup.
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Absent the competition effect, communication is used as a tool to promote and implement so-
cial norms via pressure for egalitarian allocation of resources. In committees that use unanim-
ity rules and allow communication, these social norms become the dominant force determining
bargaining outcomes, which are for the most part fully egalitarian and feature the highest effi-
ciency levels. Given the presence of unanimity rules in real-life committees, these effects are
important elements to consider when thinking about the optimal amount of interaction between
bargainers and, more generally, the transparency of the bargaining process.4
Our paper contributes to a large experimental body of literature that studies the complete
information multilateral divide-a-dollar game. Much of this literature has adopted the stylized
bargaining protocol of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and has focused on analyzing the effects
of various political institutions on the distribution of resources and bargaining efficiency. This
literature is reviewed in Morton (2012) and in Palfrey (2013). Among other things, studies have
analyzed the comparative static predictions of the Baron-Ferejohn model (McKelvey (1991)
and Diermeir and Morton (2004)), the effects of amendment rules (Frechette, Kagel and Lehrer
(2003)), of bargaining protocols (Frechette, Kagel and Morelli (2005)), of voting rules (Miller
and Vanberg (2013)), and of veto power (Kagel, Sung and Winter (2010)). The present paper
is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to study multilateral bargaining in committees that use
a unanimity rule and allow communication between group members.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The bargaining game and theoretical pre-
dictions are described in Section 2. The experimental design is presented in Section 3. Our
experimental results are reported in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5 we offer some conclusions.
2 Setup and Theoretical Predictions
We consider a classic divide-a-dollar game in which a committee ofN ≥ 3 players decides how
to allocate a fixed budget of $1 among themselves using the q-voting rule, where q ≤ N . The
parameter q represents the degree of consensus required to reach the agreement with q = N
corresponding to the unanimity voting rule.
The committee uses the standard bargaining protocol of Baron and Ferejohn (1989), which
is anN -person extension of the Rubinstein alternating offers bargaining game. At the beginning
of the first bargaining stage, one group member is chosen at random to make a proposal. A
proposal is a vector (xi1, ..., x
i
N) that specifies the share of each group member (x
i
j indicates





j ≤ 1. The proposed allocation is observed by all group members and is
immediately voted on. If q members support the proposal, then it is implemented and the
4The Council of the European Union for example has to vote unanimously on any “sensitive” issues, such as
the joining of new members or common security policies. In the United States, many private clubs admit new
members only if they are accepted by unanimity. Also in the United States, the certificate of incorporation of a
majority of companies requires action by written consent to be unanimous.
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committee adjourns. If it is rejected (gets fewer than q votes) then the budget shrinks by a
factor of (1 − δ), the committee moves to the next bargaining stage and the process repeats
itself (one group member is chosen at random to make a proposal, etc...) until a proposed
distribution receives q votes. Committee members have preferences that depend only on their
own share. The factor (1− δ) represents the cost of delay in reaching an agreement and allows
for efficiency comparisons between different final allocations. Finally, in some treatments, we
allow group members to engage in cheap-talk communication after the proposer is chosen and
before he/she submits the proposed allocation.
The general structure of the symmetric stationary subgame perfect equilibrium in this bar-
gaining game (henceforth “the equilibrium”) is independent of the degree of competition q and
the availability of communication channels.5 In this equilibrium, the proposer randomly selects
q−1 other committee members (the coalition partners) and offers them an allocation that makes
them exactly indifferent between supporting the bill and rejecting it. The proposer appropriates
the remainder of the budget. The committee members that are not invited into the coalition (if
those exist) get zero shares. Non-proposers support any bill that gives them at least as much as
their continuation value and reject any bill that gives them any amount below that. Thus, in the
equilibrium, all proposals pass without delay and the distribution of resources depends on the
voting rule in place, q. Denote by xPq and by x
NP
q shares of the proposer and coalition partners,
respectively. Then, in equilibrium




The experiments were conducted at the California Social Sciences Experimental Laboratory
(CASSEL) at UCLA between February and April of 2013. A total of 155 subjects participated
in six different experimental sessions. The subjects were recruited from the general undergrad-
uate population of UCLA and no subject participated in more than one experimental session.
All the interactions between participants were through computer terminals using the MULTI-
STAGE software.6
In all experiments, groups with five members (N = 5) bargained over a budget of 250 to-
kens. Bargaining was governed by the Baron-Ferejohn protocol described above with discount
5The stationarity refinement has been extensively used in the literature in order to overcome the multiplicity
of SPEs present in the current environment. By definition, stationary strategies cannot condition on the history of
play. Therefore, in the bargaining game with communication, the stationary equilibrium concept does not allow
bargainers to condition their votes on the conversations that preceded the current voting stage. Rather, a vote cast
for the or against the proposed allocation may condition only on the proposed distribution of resources, and, in
particular, only on the member’s own share since members care only about their own payoff.
6This software was developed from the open source Multistage package and is available for download at
http://software.ssel.caltech.edu/
5
factor of δ = 0.8, which means that following the rejection of a proposed allocation the budget
shrank by 20%. Specifically, at the beginning of each bargaining session, one of the five mem-
bers was randomly chosen to be the proposer. His/her assigned ID number was revealed to the
entire group. The proposer proposed an allocation that was observed by all members of the
group, with shares to each member clearly indicated. After that, all members of the group in-
cluding the proposer voted to accept or reject the proposed allocation. If the allocation obtained
the required number of votes q = N = 5 then it passed and the bargaining session was over.
Otherwise, if one or more members of the committee rejected the proposal, the budget shrank
by 20% and the bargaining continued with a random selection of a (possibly) new proposer
from the same group. This process repeated itself until a proposer’s allocation received all 5
votes.
We conducted two treatments: a treatment without communication, which we refer to as
the Unanimity Baseline treatment, and a treatment with communication, which we refer to as
the Unanimity Chat treatment. For each treatment, we conducted three separate experimental
sessions. Specifically, in the treatment without communication, after the proposer was se-
lected, no communication between members of a group could happen, and the proposer was
prompted to submit an allocation. In the treatment with communication, after the proposer
was determined and his/her ID number revealed to the group members, but before the proposer
submitted his/her proposal, members of the group could communicate with each other using
a chat tool. This chat tool allowed subjects to send any message they wanted to any subset
of members in their group. For instance, members could send private messages that would
be delivered only to a particular member or to a subset of members, and they could also send
public messages that would be observed by all members of the group. Subjects could only
see the messages that were sent to them. If a message was sent to two or more individuals at
the same time, those individuals observed who the other recipients were. The duration of the
communication was in the hands of the proposer: the chat tool was disabled when the proposer
submitted his/her proposal for a vote. Our software recorded all the messages sent by subjects
during the communication stage.7
Each experimental session consisted of 15 bargaining games. Before the beginning of each
bargaining game, subjects were randomly matched into groups of five and assigned an ID
number. Random matching between bargaining games and random assignment of ID numbers
was used to minimize repeated bargaining effects. At the end of the experiment, we summed
up all the tokens earned by each subject in all bargaining games and converted them to US
dollars using the rate of 50 tokens equals $1. Our experimental sessions lasted about an hour
and subjects earned on average $20, including the show-up fee of $5. Complete instructions
for the Unanimity Chat treatment are presented in Appendix A.
For the parameters used in our experiments, the unique symmetric stationary subgame
perfect equilibrium predicts that the share of each coalition member in both treatments is
7The communication protocol is identical to that of Agranov and Tergiman (2014).
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xNPq=5 = 40 tokens, while the proposer appropriates the remaining x
P
q=5 = 90 tokens.
4 Results
We present our experimental results in the following order. We start by documenting how un-
restricted communication affects bargaining outcomes (Section 4.1). Specifically, we evaluate
bargaining outcomes through two lenses: (1) the frequency of delays and inefficient agree-
ments, and (2) the distribution of resources among committee members. We then proceed to
analyze the content of the communication between bargainers and investigate the mechanism
used by bargainers to reach these outcomes, including communication protocols and voting
behavior (Section 4.2).
4.1 Bargaining Outcomes
4.1.1 Approach to Data Analysis
In the main text of the paper, we report data from the first bargaining game as well as from the
last five games in each session. The data from the first game in each session is informative as it
avoids interdependencies due to random rematching of the participants into groups throughout
the session. The data from the last five games is used to compare bargaining outcomes between
treatments after subjects have been able to familiarize themselves with the game and interface.
This is the standard method in experimental economics given the abundance of evidence that
subjects often learn the game by playing it, which results in much noisier data in the first few
periods of the experiment. In Appendix C, we present a thorough analysis of the learning
behavior over the course of our sessions.
To compare the average outcomes between two treatments and to contrast them with theo-
retical predictions, we use random effects GLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the
session level. Clustering at the session level accounts for potential interdependencies between
observations that come from random re-matching of subjects between matches in a session. De-
pending on the question under consideration, we use one of the two regression specifications
described below to provide statistical statements:
1. The first regression specification is used to compare variable of interest, e.g. an indicator
of whether the outcome is efficient or the share of the proposer, with the theoretical
predictions. We do this by regressing variable of interest on a constant term. We report
the p-value of a test where the null hypothesis is that the estimate equals the theoretically
predicted one.
2. The second regression specification is used to compare variable of interest between two
groups, e.g., two treatments. In this case, we regress the variable of interest on a dummy
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variable that indicates one of the groups and a constant. We report the p-value of a test
where the null hypothesis is that there is no difference across the two groups.
4.1.2 Efficiency
Efficiency in our setup can be measured by both the probability of delays occurring and the
proportion of initial pie realized. If a proposer is unable to gather the required number of votes,
delays in implementing a budget occur. Because the budget shrinks by 20% before a new
round of voting can take place, an inefficiency is created. Previous experimental studies have
documented higher delays in bargaining situations in which unanimity (as opposed to a simple
majority) is required to pass a proposal. (See Miller and Vanberg (2013).) This has served as
support for the theoretical argument by Buchanan and Tullock (1962) that less-than-unanimity
decision rules are more efficient.
Table 1: Efficiency and Delays
Unanimity Baseline Unanimity Chat
game 1 last 5 games game 1 last 5 games
Probability of Delays 0.06 (0.06) 0.44∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.13 (0.07) 0.07 (0.03)
Number of Bargaining Stages 1.17 (0.51) 3.14 (1.10) 1.12 (0.05) 1.06 (0.03)
Proportion of Initial Pie Realized 0.98 (0.02) 0.85∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.97 (0.01) 0.99 (0.01)
Remarks: Probability of delays measures the likelihood that the first stage proposal was rejected. Number of bar-
gaining stages and Proportion of initial pie realized report the average quantities across sessions and cluster-robust
standard errors are in parentheses, where the observations are clustered at the session level. For the probability of
delays (first row) and the proportion of initial pie realized (third row) we also report whether the observed quantity
is significantly different from the theoretically predicted one with ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ indicating significance at the 1, 5 and
10% levels, respectively.
Table 1 reports efficiency measures in the unanimity setting both with and without com-
munication. Interestingly, in the first game in both treatments, delays occur at very low rates
(statistically no different than 0 with p > 0.10 in both treatments). However, over time, delays
routinely occur in the unanimity setting without communication, consistent with the Buchanan
and Tullock (1962) intuition. Indeed, by the end of our sessions in our Unanimity Baseline
treatment, the fraction of delays is staggeringly high at 44% and bargainers loose 15% of their
initial resources on average. Both these features are inconsistent with theoretical predictions
according to which delays should never be observed on the equilibrium path, and, as a result,
100% of the initial pie is predicted to be appropriated by the bargainers.8
The introduction of communication dramatically improves efficiency both in terms of the
likelihood of delays occurring and the overall resources appropriated by bargainers: fewer
than 7% of groups that have access to communication in unanimity settings end up reaching
8Statistical analysis confirms that in the Unanimity Baseline treatment in the last 5 games the likelihood of
delays is greater than the theoretically predicted level of 0% (p = 0.008) and that bargainers appropriate less than
100% of available resources (p = 0.003).
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the second bargaining stage. Consequently, with communication, groups appropriate 99% of
available resources.9 Statistical analyses confirm that in the last 5 games, delays are much
more likely to occur when committee members do not have access to communication than
when they do. Specifically, a regression analysis that compares the likelihood of delay in the
Unanimity Baseline and Unanimity Chat treatments estimates the coefficient on the dummy
variables indicating availability of communication at −0.371 with p < 0.001. A two-sided test
of proportions performed at the session level (one observation per session) supports the same
conclusion (p = 0.0463).
4.1.3 Proposed Budgets and Final Allocations
In the previous section, we have documented the positive effect that communication has on
restoring efficiency in committees that use a unanimity voting rule. In this section, we focus on
how the availability of communication affects the distribution of resources between committee
members. In order to do so, we first abstract away from efficiency concerns and zoom in on
first stage proposals. Then we combine both efficiency and the distribution of resources and
look into the division of resources among allocations that passed.
Theoretically, both with and without communication, proposers should allocate 40 tokens to
each of the four non-proposers and appropriate the remaining 90 tokens for themselves. Table
2 presents descriptive statistics of submitted, accepted and rejected proposals that occurred in
the first bargaining stage as well as the final allocations irrespective of when they occurred.
We report three statistics: (1) the average share of the proposer, (2) the average highest share
of the coalition partners, and (3) the fraction of proposals in which all committee members
get the exact same share each, which we refer to as “Equal Split.” The first two statistics are
accompanied by their corresponding robust standard errors, which are clustered at the session
level.
We start our analysis with first stage proposals. In committees that do not have access to
communication between members, proposers tend to appropriate a higher share of resources
than coalition partners (p < 0.001 for both all submitted and all passed first-stage proposals
in the last 5 games). However, proposers under-exploit their power relative to the equilibrium
prediction: the average share of the proposer is between 64 and 68 tokens in the last 5 games
depending on whether one considers all submitted first-stage proposals or only those that passed
without delay. Regression analyses confirm that proposers’ shares are significantly lower than
those predicted by the theory in the last 5 games of the Unanimity Baseline treatment (p =
0.006 for all submitted and p = 0.012 for all passed proposals). Moreover, fewer than 15%
of all submitted and passed proposals are exact equal splits. This echoes a well-known and
robust finding in bargaining games with a majority voting rule, which establishes the failure
9We cannot reject the null hypothesis that probability of delays is equal to 0% as predicted by the theory and
that bargainers appropriate 100% of available resources in Unanimity Chat treatment in the last 5 games (p > 0.10
in both tests).
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Table 2: First-stage Proposals and Final Allocations in the Unanimity treatment.
Baseline Chat Baseline vs Chat
game 1 last 5 games game 1 last 5 games game 1 last 5 games
FIRST STAGE
Submitted Proposals
Proposer’s Share 57.4 (2.5) 68.2 (1.7) 54.1 (1.1) 50.8 (0.21) p = 0.235 p < 0.001
Max Non-proposer’s Share 46.2 (1.4) 46.0 (0.3) 49.0 (0.3) 49.9 (0.1) p = 0.085 p < 0.001
Fraction of Equal Splits 43.8% 7.5% 80.0% 88.0% p < 0.001 p < 0.001
Passed Proposals
Proposer’s Share 59.6 (0.4) 63.9 (2.9) 50.8 (0.7) 50.2 (0.1) p < 0.001 p = 0.003
Max Non-proposer’s Share 47.6 (0.1) 46.5 (0.7) 49.8 (0.1) 50.0 (0.0) p < 0.001 p = 0.003
Fraction of Equal Splits 46.7% 13.3% 92.3% 94.3% p = 0.001 p < 0.001
Rejected Proposals (for n > 2)
Proposer’s Share n/a 73.7 (1.3) n/a 59.2 (1.6) n/a p < 0.001
Max Non-proposer’s Share n/a 45.2 (0.2) n/a 48.0 (0.3) n/a p = 0.001
Fraction of Equal Splits n/a 0.0% n/a 0.0% n/a n/a
FINAL ALLOCATIONS
Proposer’s Share 58.4 (1.5) 52.1 (2.8) 49.3 (1.3) 49.5 (0.4) p = 0.004 p = 0.357
Max Non-proposer’s Share 46.5 (1.1) 40.3 (0.2) 48.5 (0.6) 49.3 (0.3) p = 0.127 p < 0.001
Fraction of Equal Splits 43.8% 28.8% 93.3% 94.7% p < 0.001 p < 0.001
Remarks: We report the average share of the proposer and the highest share among coalition partners in tokens
together with robust standard errors in parentheses, where observations are clustered at the session level. In Equal
Split allocations all members of the committee receive the exact same number of tokens (in the first stage proposals
this is exactly 50 tokens). “n/a” indicates that there are fewer than 3 observations in the category. The last two
columns report statistical tests comparing variable of interest (proposer’s share, highest share of non-proposer, or
fraction of equal splits) between Unanimity Baseline and Unanimity Chat treatments. We report p-values for the
estimated coefficient from the regression analysis (see details in Section 4.1).
of proposers to extract equilibrium rents absent communication. (See Frechette et al. (2003,
2005a, 2005b), Battaglini et al. (2012), Agranov and Tergiman (2014) and Baranski and Kagel
(2015).)
The introduction of unrestricted communication steers final allocations in the direction of
more egalitarian ones. In fact, it removes proposer power all together: In the Unanimity Chat,
94.3% of all allocations that pass without delay in the last 5 games are exact equal splits with
all members earning 50 tokens. Given that delays are quite rare in the treatment with commu-
nication, this constitutes the vast majority of all passed allocations. Focusing on all submitted
proposals in the first stage regardless of whether they passed or not shows the same pattern:
in the last 5 games 88% are equal splits when communication is allowed and only 7.5% when
communication is not allowed. Regression analysis confirms that a fraction of equal splits is
significantly different between Unanimity Baseline and Unanimity Chat treatments in both all
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first-stage submitted proposals as well as in the all first-stage passed proposals irrespective of
whether one focuses on the first game or the last 5 games in each experimental session. The
exact p-values are reported in the last column of Table 2.
Rejected first-stage proposals, on the contrary, feature higher shares for proposers and are
never equal splits, regardless of whether communication is allowed or not. Regression analysis
confirms that proposers’ shares are significantly lower in passed than in rejected first-stage pro-
posals in the last 5 games of both Unanimity Baseline treatment and Unanimity Chat treatment
with p = 0.039 and p = 0.033, respectively. The same pattern holds true even in the very first
game of each experimental session: p < 0.001 in the Unanimity Baseline and p = 0.045 in the
Unanimity Chat.
Voting patterns of non-proposers shed light on why some proposals are rejected and others
are not. Regression analysis in which we regress the vote of a non-proposer on the proposer’s
share and a constant, while clustering observations by session, reveals that non-proposers are
more likely to support proposed distribution of resources when the proposer appropriates a
lower share for himself: in both treatments, in the last 5 bargaining games, the estimated coeffi-
cient is negative and highly significant (β = −0.095 with p = 0.006 in the Unanimity Baseline
treatment and β = −0.769 with p < 0.001 in the Unanimity Chat treatment). Similarly, if we
regress non-proposers’ votes on their own shares and a constant, while clustering observations
by session, we find that non-proposers are more likely to support the proposals that give them
higher shares in the Unanimity Baseline treatment (β = 0.300 with p = 0.002 in the last 5 bar-
gaining games), while this effect is not observed in the Unanimity Chat treatment, given that
the vast majority of proposed allocations are exact equal splits. Our results on voting patterns
of non-proposers are consistent with the ones reported in the previous literature. (See Frechette
et al. (2003, 2005a)).
Patterns observed in first-stage proposals translate directly into final allocations. The main
observation is that the introduction of communication essentially eliminates proposer power
altogether. This pattern is clearly seen in the comparison of the fraction of equal splits between
Unanimity Baseline and Unanimity Chat treatments: while fewer than 30% of all final alloca-
tions in the Unanimity Baseline treatment are equal splits in the last 5 games, more than 90%
of all final allocations in the last 5 games of Unanimity Chat treatment are the exact equal splits
with no proposer power. As we saw above, while in the Unanimity Baseline treatment pro-
posers earn significantly higher shares than any other coalition partner, proposers’ advantage is
completely absent in the Unanimity Chat treatment (p > 10% in the last 5 games). The seem-
ingly close average shares of proposers in the Unanimity Baseline and Chat treatments in the
last 5 games are the combination of two different effects. The low average share of the proposer
in the Unanimity Baseline treatment is due to the high fraction of delays and the high discount
factor (since the pie shrinks by 20% following each rejected proposal). The vast majority of
proposals that pass, however, feature proposer power as proposers appropriate a higher share
of resources than coalition partners. On the contrary, the low average share of the proposer in
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the Unanimity Chat treatment is due to the fact that the vast majority of all proposals are exact
equal splits with no proposer power and that these pass.
4.2 How are bargaining outcomes reached? The effect of communication
on bargaining behavior
In this section we are interested in understanding the mechanism responsible for reaching bar-
gaining outcomes summarized in the previous section. Why does the availability of communi-
cation increase efficiency and eliminate proposers’ power in the Unanimity Chat compared to
the Unanimity Baseline treatment?
To answer these questions, we analyze conversations between subjects that occurred before
proposers submitted their proposals for a vote. The content of these conversations provides
the insights into the dynamics that drive bargaining outcomes. We show that the content of
conversations affects proposals submitted by the selected proposer, and, consequently, final
allocations.
4.2.1 Content Analysis of Conversations
Communication protocols were analyzed by two students at UBC who were not privy to the
goals of the current study. The students were given the complete transcripts of conversations
along with pre-specified categories and were asked to determine which chat message fell into
each category. (See Appendix B for the list of variables that the coders used.)
Table 8 documents the breakdown of all conversations that transpired in the first stage of the
first and the last 5 games of the Unanimity Chat treatment. In this analysis, we treat the whole
conversation that a group engaged in before a proposal was submitted as the unit of observa-
tion. All recorded conversations were classified by the coders into those that contain “relevant”
messages and those comprised of all messages that are “irrelevant”. Relevancy was broadly
defined so that messages that were in any way related to the game were counted as relevant.
Examples of commonly observed relevant messages include those that pertain to the structure
of the game, proposals, consequences of rejecting a proposal, and players’ strategies. Messages
that did not contain any of the discussions pertaining to the game being played were coded as
irrelevant. In addition, Table 8 documents how frequently communication did not take place
before proposers submitted their allocation for voting.10 We determined that a conversation
was relevant if both coders agreed that it contained at least one relevant message. 11
10The full transcripts of the chats and their classification are available from the authors upon request.
11The level of inter-rater agreement is extremely high at 94.67%. While Cohen’s kappa is particularly relevant
in situations when there is no ”objective” truth (for example, different individuals rating movies), we report it as
well even though we believe that in these conversations there is an objective way to interpret them and that when
there is disagreement, often it is clear which coder is mistaken. The value of Kappa is also very high at 0.825.
There is also a very high degree of agreement at the individual subject level: 91.78% with a Kappa of 0.836.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Group-level Conversations in the First Bargaining Stage of Unanimity
Chat treatment.
Unanimity Chat
game 1 last 5 games
relevant irrelevant no chat relevant irrelevant no chat
Frequency of conversations 86% 7% 7% 79% 5% 16%
(n = 13) (n = 1) (n = 1) (n = 59) (n = 4) (n = 12)
Length of Chat (in seconds) 64.7 38.5 n/a 58.2 20.5 n/a
Notes: The first row reports the frequency of relevant, irrelevant and no chat in the first bargaining stage using one
observation per group per match (the number of observations is listed underneath the fraction). Relevant conver-
sations are defined as conversations that contain any mention of the game being played. We use a conservative
measure of relevance and label a conversation as relevant only if both coders marked it as relevant. The third row
reports the length of the chat in seconds.
We first note that subjects used the messaging system very often. Indeed, in the last 5
games, in 84% (63 out of 75) of cases groups engaged in a conversation before the proposer
submitted allocation for voting. Moreover, a vast majority of those conversations, 94% (59 out
of 63), included discussions about the game being played.
Irrelevant conversations were quite rare and happened only in 4 groups in the last 5 games.12
There were also 16% (12 out of 75) cases in which proposers submitted their allocation before
any conversation took place. The proposals that were submitted absent any communication are
quite similar to those submitted after relevant conversations: the vast majority of them (more
than 80%) featured equal splits with each member receiving the exact same share of 50 tokens.
Furthermore, more than 90% of the proposals submitted without any preceding chat passed
right away just like proposals that were submitted after discussions of the game. Given the
small number of conversations that contained only irrelevant messages or no messages at all,
in the analysis that follows, we will focus on conversations that contained discussion coded as
relevant.
Focusing on the conversations that contained relevant messages, we further classify mes-
sages according to their content. The vast majority of recorded messages fall into one of two
categories: messages that relate to fairness of allocation, and messages that relate to self inter-
est of a specific member. Most of the messages that were classified as “fairness” messages are
similar to: “Equal is nice,” “Let’s just do 50 each,” and “Just play fair.” On the contrary, most of
the messages that were classified as “self-interest” messages are similar to: “Give me [amount
here] for an automatic yes,” and “I’ll vote yes for [amount here].” The frequencies of fairness
and self-interest messages are very different: 80% of conversations in the last 5 games con-
tain messages that lobby for fairness, while only 21% of conversations contain messages that
lobby for self-interest. 13 Regression analysis confirms that the conversations in the Unanimity
12Similar patterns are observed in the very first game: all but two groups discuss relevant to the game things,
one group talks about irrelevant things, and one group proceeds to the bargaining stage without any discussions.
13There is also a very high degree of agreement at the individual subject level. We observe high agreement
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Chat treatment contain a significantly higher fraction of fairness messages than self-interest
messages (p < 0.001).
To dig deeper into the content analysis, we zoom into the individual messages sent by
our experimental subjects and further classify each message into those delivered to the entire
group (Public messages) and those sent privately to a specific member of the group (Private
messages). Table 4 summarizes the frequency of public and private messages as well as their
content, treating messages from proposers and non-proposers separately. The content is broken
down only for the subsample of subjects whose messages were classified as “relevant.”
We start by noting that, in both voting treatments, non-proposers are more likely to use
messaging system than proposers: in the last 5 games, 81.3% of subjects at one point or another
used the chat to discuss the game when they were non-proposers, while only 46.3% of subjects
sent relevant messages when they were proposers in the Unanimity Chat treatments.14
Table 4 reveals interesting patterns characterizing the deliberation process in committees.
First of all, almost all messages (whether sent by proposers or by non-proposers) are public
and not private. Indeed, the fraction of subjects who sent a public message at least once during
the last 5 games is significantly larger than the fraction of subjects who sent a private message
at least once in the last 5 games (p < 0.001 for both groups). Similarly, over 90% of subjects
exclusively used a public communication channel in the last 5 games, while just two non-
proposers and one proposer exclusively used the private communication channel in the last 5
games.15
The second important feature of the deliberation process is the observation that group mem-
bers public channels to lobby for fairness: non-proposers do so in over 70% of all cases in which
they send public message, while proposers do so in more than half of the cases. Talking about
self-interest in public messages is not common for non-proposers, though just under a third of
proposers who use the chat feature do so.
4.2.2 How Conversations affect Bargaining Actions
How do group members respond to the deliberation process that occurs prior to allocation
submission? In this section we show that despite conversations being a cheap talk, they have a
strong effect on the submitted proposals, and, as a result, on the final bargaining outcomes.
between coders regarding classification of messages into those related to fairness and those related to self-interest:
92.27% and 90.93%, respectively. The corresponding Kappa statistics are very high at 0.831 and fair at 0.438. A
large fraction of the disagreements come from how each coder interpreted a message of just a single thing (“50”)
that was sent to everyone. One coder classified this message as fairness message, while another classified it as
self-interest message.
14Statistical tests show that in a conversation, the likelihood of proposers to engage in relevant conversation is
significantly smaller than that of non-proposers during deliberation stage (p < 0.001).
15Regression analysis confirms that the fraction of subjects who exclusively used public messages in the last 5
games is significantly higher than the fraction of subjects who exclusively used private messages with p < 0.001
for both non-proposers and proposers.
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Table 4: Frequency and content of individual messages in Unanimity Chat treatment
Unanimity Chat
game 1 last 5 games
Non-Proposers Proposers Non-Proposers Proposers
Total subjects 60 15 75 54








% who send public messages at least once 100% 100% 96.7% 96%
% who lobby for fairness 82.4% 66.7% 74.6% 58.3%
% who lobby for themselves 5.9% 0% 8.5% 29.2%
% who exclusively send public messages 100% 100% 90.2% 96%
Private Messagesa
% who send private messages at least once 0% 0% 9.8% 4.0%∗
% who exclusively send private messages 0% 0% 4.0% 4.2%∗
aWe have few observations here, 6 at most, so we do not present the fraction of subjects who lobby for
fairness or themselves
Notes: The content analysis pertains to those subjects who have sent at least one relevant message in the first stage
of the first game or the last 5 games. Note that some categories have very few observations in them. In particular,
∗ indicates the case in which we have one observation in a category (one subject).
15
Table 5: Regressions of first-stage proposals in the last 5 games of Unanimity Chat treatment.
Dependent variable
Equal split proposal Share of the proposer
Group conversation contains
messages about fairness 0.95 (0.63) -1.54∗∗ (0.28)
messages about self-interest -1.60∗∗∗ (0.19 ) 3.62∗(1.08)
Constant 0.99∗∗∗ (0.16) 51.28∗∗∗ (0.29)
# of observations 75 75
# of clusters 3 3
(pseudo) R-squared 0.170 0.170
Notes: The first column reports PROBIT regression in which the dependent variable is the dichotomous variable
that takes value 1 if the proposer submitted an equal split proposal in which all group members get the same share
of 50 tokens. The second column reports linear regression in which the dependent variable is the share of the
proposer. In both regressions, standard errors are clustered at the session level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance
at 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.
Since essentially all proposed allocations in the Unanimity Chat treatment are accepted
right away (see discussion in Section 4.1.2), we will focus on the effect of communication
on the first-stage proposals submitted by the proposers.16 Table 5 reports two regressions both
analyzing features of the first-stage proposals submitted by the proposers in the last 5 bargaining
games. The first regression looks at the determinants of submitting an equal split proposal,
while the second regression looks at the share appropriated by the proposer.
In the first regression, only conversations pertaining to selfish motives significantly impact
the probability of submitting an equal split proposal. Messages regarding fairness have no such
impact, which perhaps is an indication that equal split proposals have no need to be explicitly
talked about since by the end of the game they are the most commonly observed allocation
which always pass. Turning to proposer shares we see that both types of conversations have an
impact on proposer behavior as it pertains to her share. As is the case in the first regression,
conversations about self-interest significantly impact behavior. In particular, they lead to lower
proposer shares. Interestingly, in this case, conversations about fairness also impact proposers
and lead to lower proposer shares. However, given the results of the first regression, we see
that while conversations about fairness lead to lower proposer shares, they do not translate into
equal shares for all members. As the regression results suggest, proposers take the deliberation
process seriously. As a result, inefficient and costly delays in bargaining are practically elim-
inated; negotiations serve as a coordination device to select a specific allocation of resources
(out of many possible) which will pass right away.
16In the last 5 bargaining games of the Unanimity Chat treatment, 93% of all first-stage submitted proposals are
passed right away. Therefore, there is not enough data to analyze voting patterns of non-proposers.
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5 Conclusion
Communication is an integral part of bargaining processes. In this paper, we have studied the
effects of cheap-talk deliberation that occurs in unanimity settings, in which support of all com-
mittee members is required to pass the proposal. Absent such communication, committees that
use unanimity voting rules suffer from inefficient delays, as proposals often fail to obtain unan-
imous support even after subjects gain experience with the game. Those proposals that do pass
without delay, however, feature some proposer power, as proposers appropriate a higher share
of resources than the non-proposers. The introduction of communication has important effects
on bargaining outcomes. First, communication restores efficiency, as 99% of all proposed al-
locations pass without delay. Second, subjects mainly use a public communication channel in
which they lobby for equal and fair allocation of resources. This has a strong effect on pro-
posed allocations, as proposers give in to this pressure and divide resources equally among all
committee members. As a result, communication essentially eliminates proposer power as over
90% of all passed proposals feature the exact equal split of the available budget.
Our current results combined with previously obtained results in the majority settings (Agra-
nov and Tergiman (2014), Baranski and Kagel (2015)) suggest that even within the class of
divide-a-dollar bargaining games, communication can have very different effects on bargain-
ing outcomes depending on the voting rule in place. In multilateral bargaining games that
use a majority voting rule to reach agreements, communication has been shown to promote
higher proposer power and fewer egalitarian allocations. On the contrary, in settings that use
the unanimity voting rule and require unanimous support from all committee members to pass
proposals, communication increases efficiency, leads to more egalitarian allocations and elimi-
nates proposer power all together. In other words, communication can enhance competition in
environments where it is salient, but can also enhance social norms and reduce proposer power
in the absence of competition.
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A Instruction for the Unanimity Chat
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. The instructions are simple, and
if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you may earn a CONSIDERABLE
AMOUNT OF MONEY which will be PAID TO YOU IN CASH at the end of the experiment.
The currency in this experiment is called tokens. All payoffs are denominated in this currency.
The total amount of tokens you earn in the experiment will be converted into US dollars using
the rate 50 Tokens = $1. In addition, you will get a $5 participation fee if you complete the
experiment.
In this experiment you will act as voters. You will distribute funds between yourself and others
in a series of Periods. In each Period you will be randomly divided into groups of 5 members
each. Each group will decide how to split a sum of money. Proposals will be voted up or
down (accepted or rejected) by unanimity rule. That is, if 5 out 5 voters approve a proposal,
it passes. In any Period you will not know the identity of the subjects you are matched with
and your group-members will not know your identity. In each Period you will have to decide
how to divide 250 tokens among the 5 voters in your group. One of the 5 voters in your group
will be randomly chosen to make a proposal of how to split 250 tokens among the 5 voters
(provisional budget proposal). Each voter has the same chance of being selected to make a
proposal. Allocations to each member must be between 0 and 250 tokens. All allocations must
add up to 250 tokens. After the selected proposer has made his/her allocation, this proposal
will be posted on your computer screens with the proposed allocation to you and the other
voters clearly indicated. You will then have to decide whether to accept or reject the proposed
allocation.
If the proposal passes (gets all 5 votes), the proposed allocation is implemented and we will
move on to the next Period. If the proposal is defeated (gets fewer than 5 votes), there will be a
call for new proposals and the process will repeat itself. However, the amount of money to be
divided will be reduced by 20% of the amount of money in the preceding Round and rounded
to the nearest integer. Thus, if the proposal in Round 1 is rejected, the new proposal in Round
2 will involve splitting 200 tokens among the 5 voters. And if this new proposal is rejected in
Round 2, then in round 3 you will be splitting 160 tokens. If the proposal in rejected in Round
3, then in Round 4 you will be splitting 128 tokens, etc? This process will repeat itself until a
proposed allocation is passed (gets all 5 votes).
To summarize, the steps of the process will work as follows:
1. One voter is randomly selected to make a proposal of how to split 250 tokens.
2. A vote is held (each member of the group votes to accept or reject the proposal of the
selected voter).
3. If all 5 voters accept it, then the proposal passes and the Period is over. If the proposal is
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rejected, then the money shrinks by 20%, we move on to the next Round of this Period
and a new voter is chosen to propose the split (each of the 5 voters in a group has equal
chance of being chosen). The process repeats itself until the proposal of the selected
voter for that Round passes.
At the start of each Period, you will be randomly re-matched into groups of 5 voters each. Each
member of the group is assigned an ID number (from 1 to 5), which is displayed on the top of
the screen. Once the Period is over, you will be randomly re-matched to form new groups of 5
voters each and you will be assigned a (potentially) NEW ID. Please make sure you know your
ID number when making your decisions. Since ID numbers will be randomly assigned prior
to the start of each Period, all voters are likely to have their ID numbers vary between Periods,
and, thus, it is impossible to identify subjects using their ID numbers.
In each round, after one voter is selected to propose a split but before he/she submits his/her
proposal, members of a group will have the opportunity to communicate with each other using
the chat box. The communication is structured as follows. On the top of the screen, each
member of the group will be told her ID number. You will also know the ID number of the
voter who is currently selected to make a proposal. Below you will see a box, in which you
will see all messages sent to either all members of your group or to you personally. You will
not see the chat messages that are sent privately to other members. In the box below that one,
you can type your own message and send it either to the entire group or to particular members
of the group. To select subjects that will receive your message, simply click on the buttons that
correspond to the ID numbers of the subjects you wish to send this message to and hit SEND.
You can send a message to all members of your group by clicking the SELECT ALL button.
The chat option will be available until the voter selected to make a proposal submits her pro-
posal. At this moment the chat option will be disabled.
Remember that in each Period subjects are randomly matched into groups and ID numbers
of the group-members are randomly assigned. Thus, your ID number is likely to vary from
Period to Period, and, therefore, it is impossible to identify your group-members using your ID
number.
At the conclusion of the experiment we will sum up all the tokens you earned in the experiment
and convert this amount into US dollars using the conversion rate 50 tokens = $1. In addition,
you will receive a $5 participation fee for completing the experiment.
You are not to reveal your (potential) earnings, nor are you to speak or communicate in any
other way with any other subject while the experiment is in progress. This is important to the
validity of the study and will be not tolerated.
We will now go slowly through one practice Period to familiarize you with the screen. After
the practice Period is over, we will start the experiment, in which you will play 15 Periods for
cash.
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Review. Let’s summarize the main points:
1. The experiment will consist of 15 Periods. There may be several Rounds in each Period.
2. Prior to each Period, you will be randomly divided into groups of 5 voters each. Each
subject in a group will be assigned an ID number.
3. At the start of each Period, one subject in your group will be randomly selected to propose
a split of 250 tokens between the five of you. Before he/she submits his/her proposal,
members of the group can use the chat box to communicate with each other. You may
send public messages that will be delivered to all members of your group as well private
messages that will be delivered to members that you specify explicitly.
4. Proposals to each voter must be greater than or equal to 0 tokens.
5. If all 5 voters accept the proposal, the Period ends.
6. If one or more voters reject the proposal then a (potentially) new voter will be randomly
selected to make a proposal in the next Round of that Period.
7. The amount of money to be divided shrinks by 20% following each rejection of a proposal
in a given Period.
Are there any questions?
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ONLINE APPENDIX
B Analysis of Chat Protocols
Below we list the various variables, together with a short explanation, that the coders used in
interpreting subjects’ statements.
1. “Ask Amount.” This is the explicit amount that a non-proposer is requesting. You can
also record here an amount that someone says he will accept in exchange for a vote.
2. “Own Vague.” Responder just asking for tokens (unspecified amount).
3. “Ask Equal.” Responder asking for equality.
4. “Social Vague.” Responder asking proposer to be nice or fair or something like that.
5. “Responding.” This is equal to 1 if this statement is in response to a question on type
of split by the proposer. This is accompanied by a 1 in either AskAmount, OwnVauge,
AskEqual or SocialVague.
6. “Proposer Direct.” Dummy indicating that the proposer is trying to figure out how much
someone wants.
7. “Proposer Own.” Proposer is indicating that he/she will get a higher share than at least
some others.
8. “Proposer Equal.” Proposer is indicating that he/she intends to split equally.
9. “Unsure.” Dont know where to put a 1 but could fit in one of these categories.
10. “Relevant.” Anything you cant categorize but thats relevant: discussions about rules,
anything that is related to the game.
C Results over time
In this section, we replicate the main analysis of the data breaking all 15 bargaining games
played within each experimental session into three time periods: the first five bargaining games,
the second five bargaining games, and the last five bargaining games. The goal of this section
is to document learning behavior of subjects as they gain experience with the game over the
course of the experiment.
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Table 6 depicts three measures of efficiency: the probability of observing delays in reaching
agreements, the average number of bargaining stages prior to the agreements, and the percent-
age of pie that subjects realized as a result of the bargaining. All three efficiency measures
are quite stable across the three time periods in both Unanimity Baseline and Unanimity Chat
treatments. Indeed, delays are very likely and happen more than 30% of the time right from the
beginning of the experiment in the Unanimity Baseline treatment, reaching 44% in the last five
bargaining games. These delays are costly, since the budget available for division shrinks as
subjects take longer to reach agreement. On the contrary, subjects learn to avoid costly delays
when they communicate with each other in the Unanimity Chat treatment. While in the first 5
bargaining games delays happen 13% of the time, by the end of the experiment, the fraction of
delays is not significantly different from theoretically predicted 0%. As a result of this learning,
by the end of the experiment, subjects in the Unanimity Chat treatment appropriate more than
99% of the budget. This learning takes time, however, as in the first five bargaining games
subjects appropriate significantly less than 100% of available resources (97% to be exact).
Table 6: Efficiency and Delays
Unanimity Baseline
games 1-5 games 6-10 games 11-15
Probability of Delays 0.33∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.39∗∗∗(0.01) 0.44∗∗∗ (0.07)
Nb of Bargaining Stages 1.45 (0.03) 3.34 (1.46) 3.14 (1.10)
% Pie Realized 0.91∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.89∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.85∗∗∗ (0.01)
Unanimity Chat
games 1-5 games 6-10 games 11-15
Probability. of Delays 0.13∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.16∗(0.04) 0.07 (0.03)
Nb. of Bargaining Stages 1.12 (0.01) 1.16 (0.04) 1.06 (0.03)
% Pie Realized 0.97∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.97∗ (0.01) 0.99 (0.01)
Remarks: Probability of delays measures the likelihood that the first stage proposal was rejected. Number of bar-
gaining stages and Proportion of initial pie realized report the average quantities across sessions and cluster-robust
standard errors are in parentheses, where the observations are clustered at the session level. For the probability
of delays and the proportion of initial pie realized we also report whether the observed quantity is significantly
different from the theoretically predicted one with ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ indicating significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels,
respectively.
Table 7 reports shares of the proposers and coalition partners in each time period in first-
stage proposals as well as in the final allocations agreed upon. All main comparisons between
treatments documented in the last 5 bargaining games hold true both in the first 5 bargaining
games and in the second 5 bargaining games. Specifically, looking at the first-stage submitted
proposals, we note that proposers request a higher share of resources in the Unanimity Baseline
treatment compared with the Unanimity Chat treatment right from the start of the experiment.
Indeed, in the first 5 bargaining games, shares requested by the proposers are higher in the
Unanimity Baseline than in the Unanimity Chat treatment (p = 0.001). Furthermore, there are
significantly more equal split coalition proposals in the Unanimity Chat treatment compared
with the Unanimity Baseline treatment starting from the very first 5 bargaining games (p <
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0.001). Both these patterns continue to hold throughout the experiment and remain intact not
only for the first-stage submitted proposals but also for the final allocations. 17 Just like in the
last 5 bargaining games, rejected proposals in the first 5 bargaining games feature significantly
higher proposer shares than passed proposals (p = 0.035 in the Unanimity Baseline treatment,
and p0.079 in the Unanimity Chat treatment).
Table 7: First-stage Proposals and Final Allocations
Baseline Chat
games 1-5 games 6-10 games 11-15 games 1-5 games 6-10 games 11-15
FIRST STAGE
Submitted Proposals
Proposer’s Share 67.9 (2.33) 68.25 (2.60) 68.2 (1.72) 52.9 (0.74) 51.0 (0.52) 50.8 (0.21)
Max Non-proposer’s Share 45.4 (0.55) 45.5 (0.63) 46.0 (0.32) 49.3 (0.18) 49.8 (0.11) 49.9 (0.06)
Fraction of Equal Splits 21.3% 23.8 7.5% 85.3% 78.7% 88.0%
Passed Proposals
Proposer’s Share 61.4 (1.44) 62.2 (3.60) 63.9 (2.9) 50.2 (0.15) 50.1 (0.07) 50.2 (0.12)
Max Non-proposer’s Share 47.2 (0.38) 47.0 (0.89) 46.5 (0.72) 50.0 (0.03) 50.0 (0.03) 50.0 (0.02)
Fraction of Equal Splits 31.5% 38.8% 13.3% 98.46% 93.7% 94.3%
Rejected Proposals
(for n > 2)
Proposer’s Share 81.5 (5.18) 77.80 (1.23) 73.7 (1.25) 70.4 (5.86) 55.8 (4.85) 59.2 (1.56)
Max Non-proposer’s Share 41.5 (1.20) 43.1 (0.58) 45.2 (0.18) 44.8 (1.37) 48.7 (1.15) 48.0 (0.35)
Fraction of Equal Splits 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
FINAL ALLOCATIONS
Proposer’s Share 55.1 (1.26) 55.0 (2.09) 52.1 (2.81) 48.8 (0.20) 47.9 (0.95) 49.5 (0.35)
Max Non-proposer’s Share 43.2 (0.34) 42.1 (1.06) 40.3 (0.24) 48.7 (0.06) 48.4 (0.36) 49.3 (0.27)
Fraction of Equal Splits 36.3% 35.9% 28.8% 98.7% 93.3% 94.7%
Remarks: We report the average share of the proposer and the highest share among coalition partners in tokens
together with robust standard errors in parentheses, where observations are clustered at the session level. In Equal
Split allocations all members of the committee receive the exact same number of tokens (in the first stage proposals
this is exactly 50 tokens).
Table 8 reports the breakdown of group-level conversations into three categories: relevant
conversations (those that contain some discussion about the game, players’ strategies, and/or
payoffs), irrelevant conversations, and groups that refrained from talking in the three time peri-
ods defined above. Right from the beginning of the experiment, subjects mostly discuss things
that are relevant to the game. Irrelevant conversations are quite rare both at the beginning of
17Considering all final allocations, we note that proposers’ shares are significantly higher in the Unanimity
Baseline treatment compared with the Unanimity Chat treatment in the first 5 bargaining games (p = 0.003).
Moreover, final allocations are much more likely to be exact equal splits in the Unanimity Chat treatment than in
the Unanimity Baseline treatment in the first 5 bargaining games (p < 0.001).
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experimental sessions and at the end. There is some non-negligible fraction of groups that do
not communicate with each other: this fraction starts at 7% in the first 5 bargaining games and
reaches 16% by the end of the experiment in the last 5 bargaining games.
Table 8: Frequency of Group-level Conversations in the First Bargaining Stage of Unanimity Chat
treatment.
games 1-5 games 6-10 games 11-15
relevant irrelevant no chat relevant irrelevant no chat relevant irrelevant no chat
Conversation 89% 4% 7% 77% 4% 19% 79% 5% 16%
(n = 67) (n = 3) (n = 5) (n=58) (n=3) (n=14) (n = 59) (n = 4) (n = 12)
Chat Duration
in sections 62.2 28.0 n/a 54.0 19.9 n/a 55.8 29.8 n/a
Notes: Relevant conversations are defined as conversations that contain any mention of the game being played.
We use a conservative measure of relevance and label conversation as relevant only if both coders marked it as
relevant.
Table 9 depicts the frequency and content of individual messages sent by proposers and
non-proposers in the Unanimity Chat treatment in each time period. The analysis of content of
individual messages throughout the experiment reveals that subjects use the chats throughout
the session in a consistent manner. Specifically, the main features of chat protocols are the
same in each time period of the experiment: (a) most subjects send public messages that are
delivered to the entire group throughout the session; (b) private messages are rare both at the
beginning of the experiment and at the end; (c) public messages are used mostly to lobby for
fairness and equality rather than lobby for one’s own interests.
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Table 9: Frequency and content of individual messages in Unanimity Chat treatment
games 1-5 games 6-10 games 11-15
Non-Proposer Proposer Non-Proposer Proposer Non-Proposer Proposer
Total subjects 75 46 75 50 75 54












% send public messages 98.5% 100.0% 96.9% 93.3% 96.7% 96.0%
% lobby fairness 87.7% 83.3% 79.4% 57.1% 75.6% 58.3%
% lobby for self 6.2% 27.8% 11.1% 42.9% 8.5% 29.2%
% exclusively public 98.5% 94.4% 84.6% 73.3% 90.2% 96.0%
Private Messagesa
% send private messages 1.5% 5.6% 15.4% 26.7% 9.8% 4.0%∗
% exclusively private messages 1.5% 0.0% 3.08% 6.7% 4.0% 4.2%∗
aWe generally have few observations here, so we do not present the fraction of subjects who lobby for
fairness or themselves
Notes: The content analysis pertains to those subjects who have sent at least one relevant message in the first stage
of the first, middle or last five games.
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